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I. INTRODUCTION
1989 marks the twentieth anniversary of the Cartagena Agree-
ment,' an agreement which established the Andean Common Mar-
ket (ANCOM or "the Andean Pact").' ANCOM was formed to pro-
mote stable and uniform economic development and accelerate the
economic development of its members.3 In contrast to the Latin
America Free Trade Association (LAFTA),4 whose objectives were
generally limited to the elimination of trade barriers, ANCOM
sought to cover all aspects of economic activity.
An integral part of ANCOM was a set of regulations which
controlled foreign investment, commonly known as Decision 24
("D24").6 Adopted in 1970, D24 sought to establish a common set
of regulations governing direct foreign investment and the transfer
of technology. ANCOM intended that D24 encourage foreign in-
vestment by creating a favorable climate for stable investment.'
Nevertheless, many viewed D24 as an obstacle to foreign invest-
ment, and therefore, it engendered much opposition from its
inception.7
1. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, May 26, 1969, reprinted in INSTRU-
MENTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND IN THE CARIBBEAN 175 (1975) [here-
inafter Cartagena Agreement]. The Quito Protocol of May 17, 1987 modified this
Agreement.
2. Its members are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. Chile was a
founding member but withdrew in 1976. Venezuela, although involved in the initial discus-
sions regarding the formation of the Andean Common Market (ANCOM), did not become a
member until 1973.
3. R. Baker, Latin American Economic Integration, in REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL ORGA-
NIZATIONS, STRUCTURES AND FUNCTIONS 237 (P. Tharp ed. 1971).
4. Treaty Establishing the Latin American Free Trade Association, signed Feb. 18,
1960, reprinted in INSTRUMENTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND IN THE
CARIBBEAN 3 (1975) [hereinafter LAFTA or Montevideo Treaty]. The Latin American Inte-
gration Association (LAIA) later replaced LAFTA. For a reprint of the text of LAIA, see 20
I.L.M. 672 (1981).
5. Decision 24's formal title is Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and of
Trademarks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties, November 30, 1976, reprinted in 16 I.L.M.
138 (1977) [hereinafter D24].
6. L. MYTELKA, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 64 (1979).
7. See Armstrong, Political Components and Practical Effects of the Andean Foreign
[Vol. 20:3
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In May 1987, the five current members of the Andean Pact
agreed to a new foreign investment code, Decision 220 ("D220").1
The signing followed several years of independent implementation
by the members of ANCOM of D24, which was commonly thought
to have failed to achieve its purposes.' D220 effectively waters
down the fade-out provisions of the old code, discards D24's multi-
lateral foundations for bilateralism, abandons the establishment of
a customs union,10 and eliminates sectoral programs for industrial
development. The replacement of D24 is the culmination of many
years of dispute and debate over its programs. Decision 220 for-
mally adopts a flexible agenda allowing each member country to
implement, according to its needs, an individually tailored foreign
investment scheme.1" The general impression which remains is that
ANCOM's foreign investment code contains little binding sub-
stance. Rather, D220 legitimizes the generalized transgressions of
D24.
To analyze D220, one must read it against the background
upon which the original foreign investment code was drafted: the
Andean Pact's prior experiences with LAFTA; the Pact's desire to
attain economic independence and industrial development; and the
Pact's desire to establish different programs and policies in con-
junction with investment regulations. To this end, this comment
will review briefly the historical background and theories of eco-
nomic and social development which led to the creation of
ANCOM. It will then examine D24, its structure and reasons for
its demise. Finally, this comment will discuss the significance of
the new foreign investment code, D220, in light of the original
objectives for implementing a foreign investment code.
Investment Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1597 (1975); P. DE PALACIOS, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
AMONG UNEQUAL PARTNERS: THE CASE OF THE ANDEAN GROUP (1982).
8. Decision 220 Sustituci6n de las Decisiones 24 y Conexas Sobre el Regimen Comdn de
Tratamiento a los Capitales Extranjeros y Sobre Marcas, Patentes, Licencias y Regalias, 32
GACETA OFICIAL GRUPO ANDINO 17 (May 18, 1987); 27 I.L.M. 974 (1988); 3 INTER-AM. LEGAL
MATERIALS 169 (1987) [hereinafter D220]. D220 supercedes the following Decisions of the
Cartagena Agreement: 24, 37, 37A, 47, 48, 70, 103, 109, 110, 118, 124, 125, 144, 189. D220
also supercedes Proposition 165 of the Board.
9. See P. DE PALACIOS, supra note 7, at 275. See generally L. MYTELKA, supra note 6.
10. See Decision No. 96 of the Commission of ANCOM which established customs
unions.
11. See D220, supra note 8, art. 2.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The economic activity of the colonial Latin American econo-
mies focused on the production of commercial crops and the ex-
traction of precious metals for export, primarily to Spain. 12 These
activities established a pattern of dependence-exportation of a
few raw materials in order to fund the importation of foreign com-
modities. 13 Through the 1930s, Latin American economies largely
mirrored this pattern as they continued to export food and raw
materials in exchange for manufactured goods."' The declining
profitability from the export of these primary products and the
threat of external economic disturbances, such as war and depres-
sion, induced many Latin American countries to discover ways of
reducing their dependence on the world economy." A prominent
method attempted was import substitution ' protected by high tar-
iffs, 7 a "policy" from which several consequences flowed. Higher
tariffs allowed for inefficient firms and industries,' 8 and disparate
protection policies between sectors distorted the allocation of pro-
ductive resources.' 9 Export industries were discriminated against
causing a detrimental impact on employment.2"
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, as Latin American countries
continued their policies of import substitution,2 they experienced
increased balance of payments problems as new areas of import
substitution required more expensive imports of machinery and
equipment which usually failed "to offset the decrease in required
imports of the final product. 2 2 The import substitution strategy
12. R. CHILCOTE & J. EDELSTEIN, LATIN AMERICA: CAPITALIST AND SOCIALIST PERSPEC-
TIVES OF DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT 30 (1986) [hereinafter CHILCOTE &
EDELSTEIN].
13. Id.
14. D. MORAWETZ, THE ANDEAN GROUP: A CASE STUDY IN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AMONG
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 50 (1974).
15. Id. at 30.
16. Import substitution establishes "industries which would satisfy demand previously
met by imports (accepting as given the existing demand pattern), thereby improving bal-
ance of payments." Radway, The Next Decade in Latin America: Anticipating the Future
From the Past, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 7 (1981). Simply stated, import substitution is
the fulfillment of local needs through local production.
17. D. MORAWETZ, supra note 14, at 50.
18. Id. at 51.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 52.
22. Id. at 51. "[Tlhe higher level of technology and greater economic power result in
higher prices for foreign imports while the prices of Latin American exports follow a long-
652 [Vol. 20:3
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involved the intense recruitment of foreign capital to aid in the
establishment of facilities for domestic manufacture of formerly
imported products.23 This establishment of facilities, in turn, led to
the growth in foreign participation throughout the economy.
Prior to the 1950s, foreign investment was concentrated in the
areas of agriculture and extractive industries. 4 The 1950s saw a
shift from foreign investment in these industries to a significant
participation in manufacturing concerns.2 5 Despite the increased
domestic production, the development goals of many Latin Ameri-
can governments remained frustrated as foreign corporations' in-
vestment activities failed to conform to the economic goals of the
host countries." The indebtedness problems which resulted from
import substitution required ever increasing amounts of foreign ex-
change. In order to obtain the foreign exchange it was necessary to
develop export markets.2
The United Nation's Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLA) provided the theories for what many considered the solu-
tion-economic integration." ECLA identified industrialization
and direct economic planning as the basic elements of develop-
ment. Arguing that retention of technological process in the devel-
oped countries permitted a concentration of the gains of growth
which in turn exacerbated the terms of trade, ECLA sought to
combine import substitution with export development. 9 Using ec-
onomic integration, Latin American countries could increase for-
eign exchange income and reduce their dependence on outside di-
rected foreign investment.3 "
term downward trend. Capital is drained through repatriated profits, interest payments or
loans, fees for royalties, insurance, and shipping." CHILCOTE & EDELSTEIN, supra note 12, at
21.
23. D. MORAWETZ, supra note 14, at 53.
24. Id. at 51.
25. For example, within the Andean group, the investments in extractive industries
went from $1.06 million to $1.137 million from 1957 to 1967. Over the same period manufac-
turing investment rose to $396 million from $117 million. See M. WIONCZEK, EL GRUPO
ANDINO Y LA INVERSION EXTRANJERA PRIVADA (JUNAC Document No. JUN/di 2, Oct. 1970).
26. The increased foreign corporate presence led to an increased net capital outflow of
more than $1 billion a year in 1979. See CHILCOTE & EDELSTEIN, supra note 12, at 51.
27. L. MYTELKA, supra note 6, at 9.
28. See P. DE PALACIOS, supra note 7, at 13.
29. Id. at 13-14.
30. Balassa, Toward a Theory of Economic Integration, in LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION 21 (M. Wionczek ed. 1966). Economic integration can be defined as both a
process and a state of affairs. As a process "it encompasses various measures abolishing
discrimination between economic units belonging to different national states." Id. at 24.
1989] 653
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In February 1960, nine Latin American countries al signed the
Montevideo Treaty establishing the Latin American Free Trade
Association (LAFTA) to pursue economic integration. 2 Experts
hoped that LAFTA would be the basis for continued and signifi-
cant regional economic growth. Although LAFTA included a mini-
mal structure for a regional economic integration program, 3 the
main emphasis was on a gradual trade liberalization program, 4 to
be accomplished through a common schedule of tariff reductions
between the members with an effective reciprocity of benefits be-
tween members. 5
LAFTA members agreed to completely eliminate common tar-
iffs within twelve years.3 6 Members hoped that this reduction and
eventual removal of tariffs on products traded within the region,
would lead to an expanded market enabling the members of
LAFTA to benefit from economies of scale.37 Although the overall
concept of LAFTA envisioned a free trade area," there was a sig-
nificant lack of any foreign trade or investment regulations be-
tween LAFTA and non-members.
In 1961, the Punta del Este agreements9 created the Alliance
of Progress. The Alliance, seeking to augment regional resources by
Economic integration can be characterized in various forms such as: 1) a free trade area, 2)
custom unions, 3) a common market, or 4) economic unions. In general it is seen as no tariff
between a participating country with a common tariff against non-member countries.
As a state of affairs, economic integration is "represented by the absence of various
forms of discrimination between national economies." Id. "Total economic integration pre-
supposes the unification of economic, fiscal, and other policies and requires setting up of a
supranational authority whose decisions are binding for the member states." Id. at 25.
31. The nine countries were: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Par-
aguay, Peru, and Uruguay.
32. See Montevideo Treaty, supra note 4.
33. Wionczek, A History of the Montevideo Treaty, in LATIN AMERICAN EcONOMIC IN-
TEGRATION 67 (M. Wionczek ed. 1966). The free trade area was the primary method by
which LAFTA sought to accomplish regional integration.
34. Montevideo Treaty, supra note 4. Chapter two of this work outlines the entire pro-
gram for trade liberalization. The basic system envisions a series of tariff schedules to be
negotiated between the members.
35. In short, the Treaty provided for: 1) trade liberalization through reduction of tar-
iffs; 2) expansion and diversification of reciprocal trade; 3) most favored nation treatment
between members; 4) escape provisions for dumping or other unfair practices; and 5) special
provisions concerning agriculture. Id. art. 2.
36. Id.
37. Radway, supra note 16, at 7. See generally Wionczek, supra note 33, at 71-72.
38. Wionczek, supra note 33, at 72.
39. Charter of Punta del Este, Aug. 17, 1961, reprinted in INSTRUMENTS OF ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND IN THE CARIBBEAN 791 (1975) [hereinafter Alliance for
Progress].
19891 DECISION 220 655
increasing foreign public and private investments,40 openly en-
couraged direct foreign private investment in Latin America.41
Theoretically, the Alliance was designed to complement LAFTA. A
stated objective was "the broadening of markets through the liber-
alization of trade. . . within economic sectors provided for in the
Montevideo Treaty." '42 However, neither LAFTA nor the Alliance
coordinated among members the distribution of direct foreign in-
vestments nor provided for a common external tariff.43 This failure
insured that foreign investment funds moved toward Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico ("ABRAMEX"), three nations having the larg-
est markets and most developed industrial sectors." Consequently,
the lesser developed countries once again found themselves receiv-
ing few positive economic improvements. The dependency 45 which
had rested on western industrial countries was on ABRAMEX.
40. See Armstrong, supra note 7.
41. Id.
42. Alliance for Progress, supra note 39, tit. III.
43. See Armstrong, supra note 7, at 1598.
44. Thornton, Since the Breakup: Developments and Divergences in ANCOM's and
Chile's Foreign Investment Codes, 7 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 239, 242 (1983); see
also Ereli, The Andean Common Market, 8 Hous. L. REV. 487 (1971).
Abramex with an aggregate of 80 percent of the regional industrial production
doubled their favorable net regional trade balance, between 1962 and 1966, and
primarily in the industrial sector. The middle powers, with 17 percent of re-
gional industrial production, doubled their regional trade deficit, and again
mainly in the industrial sector while the least developed members, with 3 per-
cent of regional industrial product, changed from regional creditors to debtors,
due to increased industrial impact from Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
Ereli, supra, at 488-89.
45. Dependency is an economic theory of underdevelopment concerning the relation-
ship between developing countries at the periphery, with the developed countries in the
center. The theory advances the idea that the center exploits the periphery through increas-
ingly disadvantageous terms of trade. The developing country will never be equal because
prices for primary products decline while prices for manufactured products increase. See
generally O'Brien, The Critique o Latin American Theory of Dependency, in BEYOND THE
SOCIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT 8 (I. Oxaal, T. Barnett & D. Booth, eds. 1975).
In order to understand the reactions of Latin American countries to foreign private
investments "underdevelopment must be understood in historical perspective, that is, as a
result of the formation, expansion, and consolidation of the world capitalist system." L.
MYTELKA, supra note 6, at 17.
Thus, Latin American countries work from the position that:
there exists among the developed and the underdeveloped economies a differ-
ence, not only of the stage or the state of the production system, but also of the
function or position within the international economic structure of production
and distribution: some produce industrial goods; others, raw materials. This re-
quires a definite structure of relations of domination to assure an international
trade based on merchandise produced at unequal levels of technology and cost of
labor force.
F. CARDOSO & E. FALLETTO, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 17 (1979).
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More fundamental regional problems exacerbated this depen-
dency. These problems included: 1) virtually non-existent internal
and intra-regional communication and transportation systems;4 2)
governmental inexperience with international cooperation
processes and administrative responsibilities; 7 3) different levels of
national economic development; 8 and 4) foreign investors uncon-
cerned with assisting development, who merely viewed expanded
regional markets as a greater opportunity for sales and profits. 9
Dissatisfaction with LAFTA and the increasing disadvanta-
geous economic situation led to a meeting between the six mem-
bers in 1966.0 In May 1969, five of the six" gathered in Cartagena,
Colombia to sign the Agreement on Subregional Integration.52 The
primary purposes of the Agreement is to "promote a balanced and
harmonious development of the member states, to accelerate this
development through economic integration,. . to secure aggres-
sive improvements of the living standards of the people of the sub-
regions."53 These stated goals were to be achieved through "coordi-
nation of economic and social policies," "intensified subregional
industrialization processes," "acceleration in the trade liberaliza-
tion program," and "a common external tariff. 5 4
III. DECISION 24
A. Introduction
D24 was intended to be the teeth of the Cartagena Agree-
ment.8 5 As a major tool of the Cartagena Agreement, D24 created
46. Note, The Role of the Andean Court in Consolidating Regional Integration Efforts,
10 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 351, 356 (1980). Historical development had linked the countries
of Latin America with Europe and North America ensuring a well developed coastal area.
47. Id. at 356. The governments of Latin America developed in a state of regional isola-
tion. Their political processes were vastly different making it difficult to set up infrastruc-
tures to monitor regulations and compliances.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 357.
50. The six members were Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.
51. The five members were Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru. It was not until
February 13, 1973 that Venezuela formally became a member of ANCOM.
52. See Cartagena Agreement, supra note 1. The Agreement "was a direct outcome of
the frustration felt by some members" over the form that regional integration had taken
under LAFTA. Penaherrera, The Andean Pact: Problem and Perspective, in REGIONAL IN-
TEGRATION: THE LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 171 (A. Gauhar ed. 1985).
53. Cartagena Agreement, supra note 1, art. 1.
54. Id. art. 3.
55. For an excellent and comprehensive review of the legal and institutional framework
[Vol. 20:3
DECISION 220
common rules for foreign investments. "[F]oreign capital and tech-
nology can play an important part in subregional develop-
ment. . . to the extent that it constitutes an effective contribution
toward attaining the objectives of integration and reaching the
goals indicated in national development plans. '" D24 aimed to: 1)
exclude or diminish foreign investments within key sectors of
ANCOM's economy; 2) reduce foreign participation to a minority
position within local enterprises or companies; and 3) stimulate de-
velopment of local technology and reduce reliance on foreign
technology."
To be effective, each member needed to uniformly implement
D24. The rationale behind uniform implementation was the estab-
lishment of certainty and stability to foreign investors through a
common legal framework,58 and uniform application of D24's rules
so that member countries would not compete to obtain foreign re-
sources. 9 Nevertheless, in recognition of each country's different
economic positions, D24 permitted the individual members a mar-
gin of difference within which to implement the Code. Although
D24 dictated the minimum, each member, however, could be more
restrictive."0
Thus, D24 had a dual purpose-to protect ANCOM members'
economies and to encourage foreign investments within member
countries.6 " It was thought that the commonality of the legal re-
gime, together with their combined market size would induce for-
eign investment. However, members would still control the types,
quantity, and timing of investments made.2
B. Structure
D24 adopted a two-prong restraint over foreign investment.
There was an intricate system of controls to which the foreign in-
vestor had to adhere, 63 as well as a fade-out provision through
of D24 as it relates to Andean law, see F. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE ANDEAN LEGAL ORDER A NEW
COMMUNITY LAW (1978).
56. D24, supra note 5, preamble.
57. Schliesser, Restrictions on Foreign Investment in the Andean Common Market, 5
INT'L LAW. 586 (1971).
58. Dathino, The Andean Code After Five Years, 8 LAW. AM. 635, 641 (1976).
59. Id. at 641.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 642.
62. Id. at 641.
63. Id. at 635.
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which the foreign investor was to eventually relinquish control to
mixed or national ownership."
1. Controls
a) Registration
Within ANCOM, all foreign investments must be authorized,
approved and registered by the Competent National Authority
(CNA)6 5 of the recipient country.66 This requirement was designed
to allow member countries to evaluate and prioritize foreign in-
vestments within their particular development strategies.6 Other
prohibitions were placed on investment in activities adequately
covered by existing enterprises, as well as on direct foreign invest-
ment for the purchase of stock, shares or ownership rights belong-
ing to national investors.6 Member countries were also authorized
to reserve sectors for national development69 or to prohibit foreign
investment in specific enterprises.70
b) Classification
D24 classified foreign investment into three categories depend-
ing on the percentage of "foreignness" found within the business
enterprise:7 national enterprises, mixed enterprises and foreign
enterprises. 72 A national enterprise was one in which a national in-
vestor owned more than eighty percent of the capital and had
management control of the business enterprise.73 A mixed enter-
prise was one in which a national investor owned more than fifty-
one percent but less than eighty percent of the enterprise's capital
64. Id.
65. D24, supra note 5, art. 6. A Competent National Authority is the entity within each
member country charged with monitoring foreign enterprises through registration and other
procedures established by D24.
66. Id. art. 2.
67. Dafiino, supra note 58, at 643.
68. Id.
69. D24, supra note 5.
70. For example, insurance, commercial banking, domestic transportation, advertising,
radio and television broadcasting, newspapers and domestic marketing. Id. arts. 42 & 43.
71. Id. art. 1.
72. Id.
73. "National Investors" included aliens with more than one year of consecutive resi-
dence who renounced the right to repatriate invested capital and to transfer earnings. Other
"national investors" were the State, national individuals, and national enterprises.
[Vol. 20:3
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and management.7 4 A foreign enterprise was one in which a na-
tional investor owned less than fifty-one percent of the capital of
the enterprise .7 D24 required that, in the judgment of the appro-
priate CNA, these percentages be based on "the technical, finan-
cial, administrative, and commercial management of the enter-
prise.""6 Thus, national authorities analyzed the substance of the
transactions, instead of the form, in order to avoid "minority con-
trol by contract arrangements with national majorities. '77
c) Remittance/Reinvestment
Once foreign investors complied with registration require-
ments each could remit abroad the net profit up to a maximum of
twenty percent of their investments.7 At the time of D24's enact-
ment, this provision was one of its most controversial.79 In practice,
however, member countries have failed to use the provision as a
restriction for regulating the yearly outflow of foreign currency and
the provision has turned out not to be a profit limitation as origi-
nally feared. 0 D24 also authorized invested capital to be remitted
abroad when foreign investors either sold their shares to national
investors or liquidated them.8' Additionally, foreign investors
could reinvest up to five percent of their capital without special
authorization. " Any reinvestment above five percent was required
to follow the authorization and registration procedures. 3
74. D24, supra note 5, art. 1.
75. Id.
76. Id. Foreign enterprise is an enterprise established in a member country in which
less than 51% of the capital and/or less than 51% of the technical, financial or administra-
tive control (as determined by the local CNA), is owned or under the control of investors
from that member country.
77. Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: A New Phase In The Quest For
Normative Order As To Direct Foreign Investment, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 763, 772 (1972).
78. D24, supra note 5, art. 37. This article was amended in 1976. The amendment in-
creased the remittance amount from 14% to 20%. Cf. Common Regime of Treatment of
Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties, signed 1970, reprinted
in INSTRUMENTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND IN THE CARIBBEAN 296
(1975).
79. Oliver, supra note 77.
80. Daftino, supra note 58, at 654.
81. D24, supra note 5, arts. 7-11.
82. Id. art. 13. This limit was later increased to 7%.
83. Id.
1989]
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d) Credit Regulations
Under D24, access to credit applied only to foreign enterprises
and did not restrict investment classified as national or mixed en-
terprises."' D24 split the regulations into internal borrowing and
external borrowing. With regards to internal borrowing, access to
the local credit market by a foreign enterprise was limited to short
and medium term credit.8 5 The terms and conditions for such bor-
rowing were limited by the internal laws of each member country.8
In contrast, all borrowing from abroad needed prior authorization
from the respective CNAs and each loan agreement had to be reg-
istered with the respective CNA The approval and registration
requirements were intended to control future remittance authori-
zations because the repayment of foreign loans tends to have sig-
nificant effects on the balance of payments problem affecting host
countries. 8  Additionally, these requirements would correct the
abuse of disguising profit remittance as excessive interest on loan
repayments. 9
In all foreign borrowing contracts, the interest rate was to be
determined by the respective CNA.90 This interest rate was closely
related to the prevailing conditions in the country in which the
transaction was registered." In addition, member governments of
ANCOM were prohibited from guaranteeing, in any fashion, exter-
nal credit transactions of foreign enterprises where the state was
not a participant.2
e) Transfer of Technology
Under D24, all contracts for the importation of technology,
84. Id. art. 17.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. art. 13.
88. Daftino, supra note 58, at 660.
89. Id. Foreign enterprises could either request authorization for specific credit or for a
global line of credit. Any amounts used through the line of credit had to be registered upon
their entry into the country. Where there was a foreign credit contract between a parent
company and it affiliates, or between affiliates of the same company, the rate of interest was
not to exceed the prime interest rate by more than three points. The prime interest rate was
that in the financial market of the country of origin of the currency in which the transaction
was registered. See also D24, supra note 5, art. 14.
90. D24, supra note 5, art. 16.
91. Id.
92. Id. art. 15.
[Vol. 20:3
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patents or trademarks9 3 had to receive prior authorization by each
member's CNA 9 4 The reason for requiring this authorization was
to ensure that the member country obtain a real contribution from
this technology. 5 Furthermore, ANCOM members intended to
avoid purchasing overpriced and obsolete technology.96 The Subre-
gional Office of Industrial Property, charged with implementing
the above objectives, was created to act as the coordinating office
between the CNAs 7 D24 contained a number of guidelines which
were to be included in these contracts.9 8
In the decision to authorize trademarks and patents, those
patents and trademarks providing local or subregional technology
were required to be granted preference." Once a contract was ap-
proved or authorized, royalties could be remitted by foreign enter-
prises,100 except when the technological contribution was made by
a parent or affiliate.1 '01
f) Dispute Resolution
As an indication of ANCOM's concern regarding foreign inves-
tors and their bargaining strengths, D24 contained a very restric-
tive dispute resolution clause.'0 2 Often incorrectly termed a
"Calvo" clause,' 3 the dispute resolution clause restricted removal
93. Contracts for the utilization of foreign trademarks were limited by restrictive
clauses such as those which prohibited sales in certain countries, obligated the use of raw
materials, intermediate goods or equipment supplied by trademark owners, fixing sale or
resale prices. See id. art. 45.
94. Id. art. 18.
95. Dahino, supra note 58, at 663.
96. Id.
97. D24, supra note 5, art. 54.
98. Each contract was to contain identification of the terms of the transfer of technol-
ogy, the value of each element within a technology transfer and the time period of the con-
tract. Prohibited from these contracts were a number of clauses, including clauses obligating
purchase of goods and services from the technology provider; fixing the sale or resale prices
of products manufactured from the technology; restricting the volume or structure of pro-
duction; requiring payment of royalties on non-utilized patents; and calling for a resolution
of conflicts in a jurisdiction other than that of the recipient country. See id. arts. 19, 20 &
55.
99. Id. art. 24.
100. Id. art. 21. This clause prohibited affiliates to pay royalties to its parent or another
affiliate which provided intangible technological contribution.
101. Id.
102. Id. art. 51.
103. See Garcia-Amador, The Proposed New International Economic Order: A New
Approach to the Law Governing Renationalization and Compensation, 12 LAW. AM. 1, 5
(1980). "[Tlhis clause aims to bar the exercise of diplomatic protection when the alien, by
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of a dispute from the jurisdiction of the recipient country, when
the dispute involved investments or transfers of technology.
10 4
2. Divestment
D24 intended to limit the advantages of ANCOM's duty free
programs to products of national and mixed enterprises and those
foreign enterprises which had been transformed, or were in the
process of transforming, into national or mixed enterprises. 10 5 This
process, commonly called fade-out, is the gradual conversion of
foreign enterprises into national or mixed enterprises within a par-
ticular time period and at a specific transformation rate.
Under D24 there were two types of transformations. First,
there was an optional fade-out to mixed or national enterprises for
foreign investors desiring to take advantage of the Cartagena
Agreement's duty free status.'0 6 Second, there was a mandatory
fade-out into national enterprise status for foreign enterprises con-
tinuing to engage in the financial or marketing sectors.'0 7 D24 re-
quired the minimum percentage of local investment to be fifty-one
percent at the conclusion of the divestment period, except for
firms in the transportation, communication and domestic trade
sectors, where local participation was not to be less than eighty
percent.' As a precondition to acquiring authorization by the lo-
cal CNA, each new foreign enterprise was obliged to execute a di-
vestment agreement.' Finally, under Article 44, a member coun-
try retained the right to abrogate the prior restrictions of Articles
41 through 43 when "special circumstances exist." 10
his own account, expressly or impliedly, is committed not to request such protection from
the state of nationality." Id.
The "Calvo" clause has been viewed as a hinderance to the development of foreign
investments and a deprivation of needed financial and technical resources for countries. See
also Jova, Private Investment in Latin America: Renegotiating the Bargain, 10 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 455, 466 (1975).
104. D24, supra note 5, art. 51.
105. Id. art. 27.
106. See Cartagena Agreement, supra note 1. Chapter V of the agreement outlines the
various programs the agreement was to establish in pursuit of its trade liberalization goals.
The duty free status was to allow tariff free or tariff reduced trade among members. See id.
ch. V.
107. D24, supra note 5, arts. 42 & 43; see also id. art. 30 (new enterprises established
after July 1, 1971, a date later modified, were to participate in the mandatory fade-out).
108. Id. art. 43.
109. Id. art. 30.
110. Pike, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: An Overview, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
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C. The Collapse of Decision 24
Economic integration schemes require relative economic parity
among participants. Three obstacles which generally impede the
formation and development of integration systems among develop-
ing nations are: politicization, unequal distribution of benefits and
costs, and incompatible economic goals and policies."' In the pre-
sent context, these obstacles exemplify D24's failure, which can be
viewed as a microcosm of the problems faced by developing coun-
tries when attempting economic integration schemes.
At the time of its adoption in 1970, there existed a strong con-
sensus among the members to pursue a cooperative integration
plan using D24 as a cornerstone." 2 The members enjoyed similar
economic structures and policies even though their individual
levels of development varied considerably." 3 However, it soon be-
came obvious that the members had failed to uniformly implement
D24 in their internal legislation." 4 This lack of compliance with
the strictures of D24 would ensure the erosion of the scheme's
foundation. ANCOM members were pursuing individual develop-
ment goals to the detriment of the integration scheme, reinforcing
the principle, that "nations tend to identify with and pursue indi-
vidual and national interests more forcefully than international
cooperation.""15
L. 656, 662 (1977). This escape clause provided flexibility where local technological and man-
agerial skills proved ineffective when operating within a restrictive sector of the economy.
Additionally, member countries were allowed to reserve certain sectors for their national
enterprises. These sectors consisted primarily of the basic-products sectors, which included
enterprises dedicated to domestic transportation, media, communications, financial activi-
ties, public utilities, exploration and exploitation of minerals or forests. Foreign investments
in these sectors were exempted from requirements of fade-out during the first ten years of
the Code.
Ill. See generally P. DE PALACIOS, supra note 7; Middlebrook, Regional Organizations
and Andean Economic Integration, 17 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 62 (1978); Vargas-Hidalgo,
An Evaluation of the Andean Pact, 10 LAW. AM. 401 (1978).
112. See Pike, supra note 110, at 1600 for a history of regional developments leading to
adoption of D24.
113. INTER-AM. DEV. BANK, Socio-EcoNOMIC PROGRESS IN LATIN AMERICA ANNUAL RE-
PORT (1971). Listed below, as a very general indicator for the level of development, are the
1970 per capita gross domestic product figures for each member. Bolivia-$200, Chile-$510,
Colombia-$300, Ecuador-$285, Peru-$434, and Venezuela-$980.
114. Pike, supra note 110, at 1609-18; see also Oliver, supra note 77, at 765-66.
115. Abbott, Bargaining Power and Strategy in the Foreign Investment Process: A
Current Andean Code Analysis, 3 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 319, 331-32 (1975).
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1. Structural Weaknesses
A major weakness of D24, which frustrated its uniform imple-
mentation, was the failure to define many of the important
terms.1" D24 used terms such as direct foreign investment, new
investment, reinvestment, foreign and national investors, and na-
tional, mixed and foreign enterprises without any consistent legal
definition.
A key term, empresas, has been translated as "enterprises." A
loose legal term, it has been variously defined as corporation, part-
nership or branch.117 The clarity of term is important because
partnerships or corporations are considered juridical persons,
whereas a branch does not hold the same juridical status." 8
The lack of a precise definition of these terms lead to inconsis-
tent practices among members. For instance, direct foreign invest-
ment in Bolivia was considered to be the total investment made
and registered, but in Colombia direct foreign investment was the
registered imported capital, plus reinvestment, less losses." 9
Profit remittance was another subject of disparate treatment
by members. Under Article 37, foreign investors could transfer
abroad twenty percent of their profits with authority from the
CNA. However, questions arose over what was the basis upon
which this twenty percent was calculated. Would the twenty per-
cent figure be based upon gross or net profits? Would the base in-
crease by any reinvestment in subsequent years? Would one be
able to carry over from previous years in which less than twenty
percent was remitted that amount plus the twenty percent for the
year just completed? Moreover, Article 37 permitted profit remit-
tances to exceed twenty percent when there were special circum-
stances. 20 The definition of special circumstances was left to the
individual members to define. 2 '
Even the fade-out provisions of D24, thought to be clear-cut
and straightforward, left open the terms and conditions of trans-
116. Rose, The Andean Pact and its Foreign Investment Code-Need for Clarity?,
1975 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 3, 6-9.
117. Id. at 7.
118. Id. at 3. Partnership and corporations are considered to be juridical persons under
civil law rules, whereas branches usually lack a separate juridical personality from their
headquarters.
119. Id. at 8.
120. D24, supra note 5, art. 37; see also Rose, supra note 116, at 10.
121. See D24, supra note 5, art. 37.
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formation contracts; where the local financing would originate to
purchase the shares and rights of the foreign enterprises; and
which of enterprises would have to transform.' Furthermore,
companies which exported eighty percent of their products or were
active in the tourism industry, ' or companies engaged in the ex-
traction of mineral resources,'24 could avoid divestment entirely.'25
The different systems of registration used by ANCOM mem-
bers stifled D24's effectiveness.' 26 Without any conformity among
its members, it was impossible to determine which foreign corpora-
tions could remit profits, how much they could remit, and how
much foreign investment existed within ANCOM.'27
Finally, D24 lacked the ability to sanction its members for vio-
lations of its provisions or to force recalcitrant members to accept
its authority.' 8 Without the means by which members could judi-
cially arrive at a consistent interpretation of the terms or clauses,
D24 only exacerbated preexisting disharmony among members.' 9
2. Chile's Withdrawal
Chile underwent significant political upheaval in September
1973, when General Augusto Pinochet replaced the socialist Al-
122. For concrete examples involving the diversified implementation of this highly con-
troversial section of D24, see Rose, supra note 116, at 13-14.
123. D24, supra note 5, art. 34.
124. Id. art. 40.
125. Id.
126. Dafhino, supra note 58, at 643-44. The example given by Dahino concerns a royalty
payment. The transfer of a technology contract had been approved and authorized by one
CNA however the CNA regulating foreign exchange denied the authorization to purchase
foreign currency to pay for the technology.
127. Id. at 651-54.
128. Horton, Peru and ANCOM: A Study in the Disintegration of a Common Market,
17 TEx. INT'L L.J. 39, 50 (1982). The Cartagena Agreement recognized a general system of
dispute resolution between its members, though it did not provide for a community wide
judicial organ to arbitrate legislation and disputes. The first serious challenge to ANCOM
law came from the Supreme Court of Justice of Colombia when it invalidated the Colom-
bian President's promulgation of D24.
For an overview of ANCOM's basic methods of dispute resolutions, see O'Leary, The
Andean Common Market and the Importance of Effective Dispute Resolution Procedures,
2 INT'L TAX & Bus. L. 101 (1984).
129. On May 29, 1979, the foreign ministers of the Andean Pact countries signed the
Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, 18 I.L.M. 1203 (1979).
They hoped this institution would provide the interpretative authority for the Pact's inte-
gration efforts. The success of the court depends upon the willingness of the Pact's members
to submit to a supranational authority, a willingness which has not been demonstrated in
the past.
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lende government with a capitalist model."' 0 Under Allende, eco-
nomic development was thought possible without the need of for-
eign capital." The Allende government had followed D24
guidelines as it accelerated the realignment of its domestic econ-
omy through the nationalization of major sectors of the econ-
omy.1312 However, under the Pinochet government, Chile reversed
these nationalization policies and actively pursued foreign invest-
ment to divest the government of its nationalized industries.133
On July 13, 1974, the Pinochet government implemented its
own foreign investment code, Decree Law 600 ("DL600")."'3 In
contradiction to D24, DL600 allowed foreign capital virtual un-
restricted entry into Chile.13 5 The other members of ANCOM
strongly criticized DL600, believing that Chile was attempting to
attract foreign investment at their expense. 13 Chile countered that
D24 conflicted with its development model and prevented the nec-
essary foreign investment for that model.13 7 Chile further argued
that because of its special national interests, it could ignore certain
ANCOM measures. 8  Chile's partners in ANCOM looked to reach
a compromise in order to keep Chile as a member. In October and
November 1976, the Commission adopted several amendments
aimed at reducing the scope of the dispute.3 9 Despite this flexibil-
ity on the part of ANCOM, Chile pulled out, citing in particular its
opposition to the fade-out provision.
Initially, ANCOM and D24 appeared to emerge from the Chil-
ean crisis with some semblance of order and uniformity. 40 Never-
130. Comment, Chile's Rejection of the Andean Common Market Regulation of For-
eign Investment, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 138, 151 (1977).
131. Id. at 150.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 151.
134. Foreign Investment Statute, Decree Law No. 600, 13 I.L.M. 1176 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter DL600].
135. See Comment, supra note 130, at 151-52; see also Thorton, supra note 44, at 248.
136. Thornton, supra note 44, at 248.
137. BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORP., CHILE AFTER ALLENDE 66, 67 (1975).
138. Carcano, Investment and the Andean Pact: From Political Response to Legal
Structures to Safe Harbors, 2 DICK. INT'L L. ANN. 96, 154 (1983).
139. Decision No. 103 of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, Nov. 30, 1976,
16 I.L.M. 138 (1977). The amendments included the following: 1) fade-out could now be
accomplished through an increase in capitalization as well as through the purchase of stocks
and bonds; 2) an agreement on a uniform implementation date for fade-out; 3) increase in
the reinvestment provision from five to seven percent; 4) access to medium term loans for
foreign investments; and 5) profit remittance from 14% to 20%.
140. Following the withdrawal of Chile, ANCOM demonstrated cohesion and approved
Decision 100. a tariff reduction time table, and reaffirmed their commitment to maintain
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theless, the pursuit of individual economic goals, disparate eco-
nomic systems, and strongly nationalistic governments continued
to disrupt the uniform implementation of D24.
3. Peru and Recent Troubles
In 1980, a conservative Peruvian government was installed in
Quito. 4" As with the Pinochet government in Chile, this new Peru-
vian regime began the reversal of the nationalization process begun
by earlier governments. 4" The government reduced the maximum
external tariffs from 120 percent to sixty percent, de-emphasized
ANCOM's sectoral programs, and implemented an export incen-
tive program (CERTEX).'4 3 These initial changes were in distinct
conflict with the goals of D24.
Additionally, Peru passed a series of resolutions which under-
mined several important provisions of D24.1" One resolution effec-
tively eliminated the twenty percent limitation on profit remit-
tances." 5 The new resolution permitted remittances in excess of
twenty percent to those foreign investments which developed back-
ward regions of the country, created new employment opportuni-
ties, diversified exports, or produced goods necessary to Peru's
economy. 4" A second resolution, in contradiction to Article 24 of
D24, eliminated the requirements regarding foreign investors' sales
of shares to local investors.' 47
ANCOM's other members responded to Peru's relaxation of
D24 with the unilateral liberalization of their own foreign invest-
ment laws.' 48 This retaliatory action taken by member countries
crippled major programs of D24.' 49 As a consequence, the junta of-
fered proposals for change at the end of the summer of 1981.15' In
1982, the junta also presented an evaluation of the progress of
their strategy of developmental nationalism and reduced dependency.
141. Horton, supra note 128, at 56.
142. Id. at 55-56.
143. Id. at 56-57.
144. O'Leary, supra note 128, at 115.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 116.
148. Id.
149. The perception among the members was that there was less foreign investment
available, thereby increasing the internal competition to capture this scarce resource.
150. Horton, supra note 128, at 57.
19891
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
D24.' 5 '
As a result of the dissention among members, the Andean
Pact Commission met for the first time in over a year at the begin-
ning of 1983 to decide the Commission's future and resolve the ma-
jor problems brought about by the unilateral protectionism of
member countries. 5 ' This was followed by a reunion of five An-
dean Presidents on July 24, 1983. Despite the importance of this
meeting, they were unable to resolve the problems created by the
protectionist measures taken by various members.' 53 Again in May
1984, the junta proposed further modifications to D24.15 4 Through-
out 1985, the Andean group continued to struggle with the revision
of the foreign investment rules. In December 1986, the five Presi-
dents of the Andean Pact agreed to meet in early 1987 to try to
salvage D24.'55 Thereafter, in January 1987, the working group of
the Commission achieved a final modification of D24. The Com-
mission approved the textual modifications and all of the proposi-
tions of the work group. The major sources of contention, namely,
implementation, fade-out, and divestment, appeared to have been
resolved. On May 18, 1987, the Presidents met once again and ap-
proved the new foreign investment code, Decision 220.156
IV. DECISION 220
A. Introduction
D220 is a reversal of the binding norms found under D24.
Though D220 contains many of the tenets of D24, they are not
mandated and each member is free to apply the regulations as it
151. Id. at 58.
152. Commission to Look at the Rules, LAT. AM. REGIONAL REP.: ANDEAN GROUP, Jan.
28, 1983, at 2.
153. Little New from the Caracas Summit, LAT. AM. REGIONAL REP.: ANDEAN GROUP,
July 29, 1983, at 3.
154. The junta identified two causes for the difficulties of the Andean Pact. The first
reason was that the subregional GDP grew only 2% in 1981 and did not grow at all in 1982
after growing at the rate of 6.8% annually during 1970-1979. The subregion exports declined
by 16% in 1982 after growing at 18% in 1970. The second reason was that political changes
in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru have had distinct repercussions on economic policies. Andean
Pact Redefines its Aims, LAT. AM. REGIONAL REP.: ANDEAN GROUP, Oct. 5, 1984, at 4-5.
155. The main criticism of D24 had been that it did not respond to the regions needs. It
did not encourage integration, nor did it lead to more foreign investments. Each member
had "broken the rules" of D24. Region's Presidents Will Attempt to Salvage the Andean
Pact, LAT. AM. REGIONAL REP.: ANDEAN GROUP, Dec. 11, 1986, at 1.
156. D220, supra note 8.
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chooses." 7 In those instances where common regulatory guidelines
were retained, most were eased to provide greater flexibility to
each member. '58 The major changes include the following: 1) di-
vestment is no longer obligatory, foreign investors have access to
all sectors except those closed by individual countries; 2) the au-
thorization requirement by the CNAs has been reduced to little
more than registration; 3) there are no longer foreign loan ceilings;
4) local loans are no longer restricted; 5) the remittance of profits
nominally retains the twenty percent ceiling but it is easily renego-
tiated, and; 6) the "Calvo Clause" has been effectively removed. '59
B. Structure
1. Controls
a) Registration
D220 retains the requirement that all foreign investment must
be registered by the CNA of the recipient country. ' Nominally,
the purpose remains the evaluation and prioritizing of foreign in-
vestments. However, D220 removed restrictions which prohibited
investments in specific enterprises as well as those which pre-
vented foreign investors from purchasing stock, etc. from national
investors.'"' An examination of the CNA's duties under D220'12
reveals them to be essentially bookkeeping type functions. Author-
ity is given to regulate remittances, license contracts and invest-
ment in existing companies.' 3 This "authority" is then severely
proscribed by subsequent language or articles. The inevitable con-
clusion is that the CNA simply performs housekeeping functions.
b) Classification
D220 retains the classification definitions found in D24.' 64 No
significant changes were made.
157. See Esquirol, Foreign Investment: Revision of the Andean Foreign Investment, 29
HARV. INT'L L.J. 169, 171 (1988).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 172-73.
160. D220, supra note 8, art. 5.
161. Id. art. 4.
162. Id. art. 6.
163. Id. art. 1 & 6.
164. Id. art. 1.
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c) Remittance/Reinvestment
The nominal figure for the repatriation of net profits remains
at twenty percent of the investment. 65 However, each member
country may authorize higher percentages. 6" Repatriable capital is
strictly defined as follows: the initial direct foreign investment plus
any further increments and reinvestment, registered and made,
less any net loss."8 7 Also included in D220 is an exchange rate
clause permitting remittances to be converted only at the time that
they are made.' 68 Foreign, and now subregional investors, can con-
tinue to repatriate the amounts received from selling their shares
from capital reduction or from liquidation.'69
Reinvestment, formerly restricted to seven percent of the in-
vestment, has been augmented to allow each member country to
determine which profits and how much of those profits will be per-
mitted as reinvestment. 7 ' Articles 2 through 6 remove the authori-
zation restrictions of D24, once again permitting direct foreign in-
vestments in the shares, rights and participations of national and/
or subregional investments'
d) Credit Regulations
As prescribed under D24, D220 also requires foreign credit
contracts to be registered with'the CNA of the recipient country. 7'
However, many of the credit restrictions imposed by D24 have
been removed. The local credit restrictions have been lifted com-
pletely. Each country determines what, if any, limits it will place
upon a foreign investor's access to local credit.'72 Former restric-
tions in D24 placing an interest rate ceiling on credit contracts
paid abroad also have been removed. 73 Furthermore, the "restric-
tion" on governments of member countries endorsing or guarantee-
165. Id. art. 15.
166. Id. The CNA can also authorize the investment of excess profits after distribution.
This investment will be considered direct foreign investment.
167. Id. art. 8.
168. Id. art. 9.
169. Id. art. 7.
170. Id. art. 10.
171. Id. art. 11.
172. Id. art. 14.
173. Id. art. 13. Under D24 the CNAs were required to follow a 3% ceiling on interest
rates for credit contracts between parents and affiliates. Now, however, this rate is open for
negotiation.
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ing external credit transactions has been retained.174
e) Transfer of Technology
With one major exception, most requirements of D24 on the
importation of technology, trademarks and patents continue to ap-
ply. 175 An exception arises where an intangible technological con-
tribution has been furnished by a parent company or affiliate.
176
Under these circumstances, payment of royalties may now be
authorized. 177
f) Dispute Resolution
Significantly, D220 removed the "Calvo Clause" restriction of
D24. Article 34 states "for the settlement of disputes or conflicts
arising from direct foreign investments or from the transfer of for-
eign technology, member countries shall apply the provisions es-
tablished in their local legislation.' 78 This is an important conces-
sion. Formerly, it was not possible to remove a dispute from the
jurisdiction of the host country. 179 Now, however, if domestic law
permits, the location and the law of dispute resolution can be
negotiated.
2. Divestment
Chapter II of D220 explains the new fade-out provisions. For
Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela the transformation is to take place
across thirty years. For Bolivia and Ecuador, D220 allows thirty-
seven years for the transformation process. 80 The provisions for
fade-out are completely voluntary. Foreign companies may enter
into a fade-out agreement at any time.' 8 ' Those currently under a
transformation agreement may request its termination or modifica-
tion to the current structure. 8 2 The fade-out contracts can be
174. Id. arts. 11 & 12.
175. Id. arts. 18-24.
176. Id. art. 22.
177. Id. art. 21.
178. See id. art. 34.
179. Cf. D24, supra note 5, art. 51.
180. D220, supra note 8, art. 25.
181. Id. art. 26.
182. Id.
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modified, ended, or restarted at any time.1 83 These changes effec-
tively remove any requirement to fade-out foreign ownership.
3. Miscellaneous
Direct foreign investments will not be authorized in other
member countries for products exclusively assigned to Bolivia or
Ecuador. 84 ANCOM members have promised to commit them-
selves to coordinating their actions in international organizations,
exchanging information on foreign investments in their territories,
keeping each other informed as to their application of the code,
and not granting foreign investors more favorable treatment than
that granted to national investors.185
The provisions spelling out the powers of the Commission and
the Junta remain virtually unchanged with one exception. The ex-
ception, under Article 55 of D24,"8 ' dictated that the Commission
was to establish a subregional system for the development, promo-
tion, production, and adaptation of technology. 87 Removing the
content of Article 55 of D24 from D220 further indicates that
ANCOM is moving away from a multilateral and centralized appli-
cation of investment restrictions to a more individual and flexible
approach.
Chapter V of D220 incorporates a number of temporary provi-
sions from D24. Direct investments from the Andean Development
Corporation"88 will be considered as national investments. The in-
vestments from public international financial institutions'89 will be
considered neutral, and these entities are exempt from the obliga-
tion to sell their shares. 9 ' In all other respects, these international
financial institutions are subject to .D220. Other public interna-
tional financial entities can also have their investments classified
183. Id. arts. 26-29.
184. Id. art. 31. D220 retains some of the protective elements D24 afforded to Bolivia
and Ecuador.
185. Id. arts. 32 & 33.
186. Id. art. 55.
187. Id. art. 22. Articles 22 under both D220 and D24 are identical.
188. Id. art. 38. These investments still need to comply with D220's authorization and
registration procedures, minimal as they may be.
189. These institutions include: Andean Development Corporation (CAF), Interameri-
can Development Bank (IDB), International Financial Corporation (IFC), German Associa-
tion for Economic Cooperation (DEG), Denmark's Industrialization Fund for Developing
Countries (IFU). See D220, supra note 8, annex.
190. D220, supra note 8, arts. 41 & 43.
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as neutral." 1
C. Decision 220 as Problem Solver
Determined that foreign investment would play a complemen-
tary role in the development requirements of its members,
ANCOM, while writing the initial foreign investment code, sought
to harmonize the interests of the foreign investor with their own
development needs. 192 D24 was designed to directly affect the be-
havior and operation of national and foreign investors within
ANCOM. The code intended a planned reduction of foreign invest-
ment, a strengthening of the bargaining position of national firms
vis-a-vis foreign firms and the strengthening of the bargaining po-
sition of the member countries vis-A-vis other countries, suppliers
of capital and technology, and international organizations. '93
Initially, a consensus existed within ANCOM regarding the
convenience of a simple set of regulations. There would be no in-
centive for struggles or conflicts between members, which would
have the effect of reducing the members' power of negotiation and
the comparative advantage of their positions. 9 4 However, the
transformation of the relationship between foreign investors and
the national economies occurred and was enforced in an atmo-
sphere of hostility and indifference.1 9
5
From the beginning, two major sources of contention, the
fade-out provisions and the percentage caps on profit remittances,
prevented consistent application of the foreign investment code.
The arguments against these programs were based upon the pre-
mise that these restrictions would reduce or dry-up foreign invest-
ment within the Andean Pact.1 9e Under D24, the fade-out provi-
sions were relatively strict and concerned almost all foreign
investments. D220 removes the concerns members may have had
that foreign investors will find divestment particularly trouble-
some. It now provides only generalized guidelines on divestment.
191. Id. arts. 42-44. Other public international financial entities can request through an
application, accompanied by their incorporation papers and investment policies, neutral in-
vestment status. The Commission can approve this request, following a report by the Board
with a two-thirds positive vote and no negative votes.
192. P. DE PALACIOS, supra note 7, at 182-83.
193. See D24, supra note 5, Declarations.
194. P. DE PALACIOS, supra note 7, at 183.
195. Id. at 184.
196. See D24, supra note 5.
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The transformation time frame has been doubled, 9 ' and now con-
cerns only companies desiring access to the trade scheme within
the Andean market. Furthermore, the transformation agreements
involve primarily the foreign investor and respective CNA. Because
these agreements no longer need to meet the centralized require-
ments of D24, considerable flexibility is allowed. To make matters
even easier, these contracts can be renegotiated at any time.19
Members are free to interpret the divestment rules according to
their needs. Foreign investors should not have any problems with a
thirty or thirty-seven year fade-out since it generally covers the
economic life of most investments.
Under D24, profit remittance was originally capped at four-
teen percent and was mandatory for all members.'99 Following the
disputes with Chile, this cap was raised to twenty percent. Each
member country was also authorized to increase these percentages
under certain circumstances.2 0 The new provision in D220, Article
15, retains the twenty percent limit; however, the provision allows
member countries to be as restrictive or as liberal as they desire.
Foreign managers have viewed the relaxed treatment of these re-
mittances as a welcome change, although it has been noted that
such remittances still remain subject to balance of payments con-
straints.2"' Nevertheless, under D220, individual members may
treat to their own unique economic problems without the former
uniform restraints D24 placed on the members. To further ease the
hesitancy that foreign investors had over D24, D220 has liberalized
intercorporate payments and lifted the seven percent ceiling on
profit reinvestment.0 2 The foreign investment restrictions in cer-
tain sectors have also been eased.03
D220, by allowing members to operate as freely as they desire,
will negate the criticism that D24's fade-out and remittance re-
strictions were too restrictive. In one sense, D220 solved a problem
members had with the original investment code. On the other
hand, this resolution does not answer the broader questions of
what role the foreign investment code is to play in ANCOM and
197. See D220, supra note 8, art. 25.
198. Id. art. 26.
199. See Dafiino, supra note 58, at 654.
200. D24, supra note 5, art. 27.
201. How Colombia Plans to Ease Foreign Investment Rules Following Changes in
ANCOM, Bus. LAT. AM., July 13, 1987, at 223.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 217.
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whether D220 works to effectuate that role.
D24's problems left the impression not only that it lacked a
uniform implementation by its members, but that its very prem-
ises were not accepted by the same.20 4 Despite its initial acceptance
as a necessary tool, at no time during D24's history has there been
consistent and uniform application or interpretation of its provi-
sions. 05 By itself, D24 had little impact in altering the structure of
foreign ownership in Andean economies. ' It did not have the ex-
pected negative impact on direct foreign investment in the manu-
facturing sector. On the contrary, United States direct investment
in the region rose between 1970 to 1976.207
The leeway which D220 now leaves to ANCOM's members is
in reality a formalization of the members' past transgressions
against D24. A desire for uniformity is not apparent under the
changes made in the investment code by D220. The new code may
have cured the former code's structural exceptions and perhaps
tightened some of the definitions, but D220 has not resolved the
inherent ambiguities which have existed since the foreign invest-
ment code's inception.
As a problem solving device, it would appear that D220 will
resolve the clashes which periodically arose between members over
the implementation of D24. The new degree of latitude each mem-
ber has to interpret and to implement it, leaves little opportunity
for conflicting practices. It is an agreement designed to allow its
membership to disagree.
However, when D220 is read in conjunction with the original
goals of the foreign investment code and the experiences of
ANCOM's members with LAFTA, three ironies are apparent. D220
will not prevent ANCOM's members from increased intra-member
competition in the pursuit of direct foreign investment. As with
the previous experience under D24, it is again likely that invest-
ment capital will tend to flow towards those countries having a
more developed market structure. At present, with some exception
allowed for mineral extraction, Venezuela and Columbia are such
developed countries.
Secondly, in contrast with stated goals, neither the members
204. L. MYTELKA, supra note 6, at 111.
205. Id.; see also P. DE PALACIOS, supra note 7, at 186.
206. L. MYTELKA, supra note 6, at 86.
207. Id. at 100.
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nor their national enterprises will benefit from an increase in bar-
gaining power vis-A-vis foreign entities. The "united front" posture
has been abandoned. D220 formally departs from the principle of
capital and foreign investment regulation.
Third, the common foreign investment regulation policy was
originally viewed as a cornerstone of economic integration.'" If in
place and operating in a consistent fashion, it was thought that the
members would direct economic growth and investment into target
areas.209 In practice, however, the investment code has been inef-
fective. D220 will not correct any of these drawbacks. Rather, the
adoption of D220 removes any vestige of united action; it is an
abandonment of the principle of economic integration. "1 '
V. CONCLUSION
It has been suggested that a legal framework that deals with
foreign investment is required to protect the member countries
and foster an influx of foreign resources for a successful Andean
common market. The implementation of D24 lacked the clarity
and uniformity necessary to provide a consistent interpretation of
the investment code. In fact, the members of ANCOM pursued in-
dividual programs designed to benefit their respective countries
with little regard to their impact on the common market.
Decision 220 recognizes the current status quo, the individual
members' self-regulation of foreign investment. The overall struc-
ture of D220 simply provides a set of guidelines. The decision lacks
the means to enforce consistent interpretation or application of its
provisions. Enacted as part of the Quito Protocol, which itself
moves away from the common integration theories of the Carta-
gena Agreement, D220 is an agreement which sanctifies competi-
tion between ANCOM's members.
It is apparent that the premises upon which ANCOM was es-
tablished are being challenged. An alternative concept of a com-
mon market views the control of goods, rather than the control of
foreign financial resources, as the more relevant basis for economic
208. P. DE PALACIOS, supra note 7, at 182.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 13. Theories of economic integration diverge from the more traditional views
of international trade. The orthodox view holds that each country has its own comparative
advantage in labor and/or resources and that trade will lead to specialization which, in turn,
leads to a relative leveling.
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integration. However, ANCOM is not even seriously pursuing this
idea. The Quito Protocol removed specific target dates on the im-
plementation of common tariffs between members and as against
non-members. It extended safeguards so that members can protect
their own domestic markets from the harmful exports of their
partners and has modified the sectoral industrial programs to allow
for more individual and bilateral developments.
Decision 220 will be the initial vehicle by which ANCOM can
move away from the more formal strictures of economic integra-
tion. The abandonment of a common regime on foreign invest-
ments again exposes each member to competition from the larger
and more developed nations of Latin America. D220 has returned
the Andean Pact members to their market positions of 1970. The
crucial question, however, remains; whether the members can
maintain the necessary momentum to create a common market.
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